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In one of the few widely discussed passages in the Doctrine of Right, Kant
makes the surprising claim that a shipwrecked sailor who dislodges another from
a plank that will support only one of them is "culpable, but not punishable. "Many
commentators regard this passage as a sort of smoking gun that shows that, in
extremis, Kant resorts to the very sort of empirical and consequentialist reasoning
that he claims to do without. My aim in this paper is to defend his analysis, by
showing both that it can be generalized, and that it provides a satisfying account of
the normative boundary between justification and excuse in the criminal law.
After explaining Kant's remark in light of the context in which he makes it, my
main strategy of defense will be to show how it applies not only to the specific
example Kant considers, but also to cases in which a person responds to danger by
damaging property, and those in which a person whose own life is not in danger
breaks the law to save the life of another. I will also use his account to illustrate
the difficulties with the leading alternatives.
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damaging property, and those in which a person whose own life is not in danger
breaks the law to save the life of another. I will also use his account to illustrate
the difficulties with the leading alternatives.
I. LAW AND MORALITY
This paper is part of a more general project, focused on Kant's legal and
political philosophy, the central theme of which is that law must be understood in
terms of the legitimate use of force, rather than as an instrument for achieving ends
that are regarded as morally desirable from some other perspective. On this
Kantian view, the basic structural features of a legal system are expressions of the
system's entitlement to force people to respect the equal freedom of others. The
claim to coerce depends upon the legal system's claim to do justice, but the
connection is mediated through its systematic features. As a result, on the Kantian
view, law does not and must not aspire to be morality or to capture every morally
important distinction. Instead, it is limited to what he calls "external" lawgiving,
that is, it must depend on laws for which the incentive for compliance does not
depend on whether the person to whom the law is addressed accepts the law as a
principle of action.
The general idea of reciprocal limits on freedom provides Kant with the
outline of an account of criminal law. The commission of crimes against persons
and property is a particular way in which one person treats another as a mere
means. Criminal law is part of a layer of public law governing relations between
individuals and the state, built on underlying structures of the private law that
govern interactions between private parties. The structure of the criminal law
follows the structure of private wrongs, since the latter law defines the basic
categories of wrongs against persons and property that are the main subject of the
criminal law. Kant's account of private wrongdoing is not harm-based, but rights
based: a private wrong is an interference with the freedom of another person.4
There are two basic types of interference: injury and trespass. An injury involves
depriving a person of some power to which he had a right-by damaging or
literally depriving him of it. Injuries to person, property and reputation deprive
their victims of powers that they had-their ability to use their own bodies, their
goods, or their good name. Injuries restrict freedom, depriving persons of means
that they had with which to set and pursue their own purposes. A trespass involves
using another person or his goods in pursuit of an end that the latter person does
not choose to pursue. Trespasses against person, property and reputation use what
properly belongs to one person for another's purposes: one uses another's powers,
and in so doing subjects the powers of the first to the other's choice.
3 Recent moral philosophy has often been criticized for being excessively legalistic; my own
view is that criminal law theory is too often excessively moralistic.
4 I develop this division of right (and so of wrongs) in detail in Arthur Ripstein, Authority and
Coercion, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2004).
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An important consequence of this division is that some harms are not even
prima facie wrongful, while some wrongs are not harmful. If I deprive you of
something to which you have no right-the view of the sunset over my land, or the
use of someone else's property-I do not wrong you. If I deprive you of
something to which you have a right, I wrong you even if I do not harm you.
Suppose that, without consulting you, I take an afternoon nap in your bed, while
you are out of the house. (I bring my own sheets, sweep the floor on my way out,
and so on). I do you no harm, but I wrong you in Kant's sense. The same is true if
I embezzle from you and return the money with interest. Crimes against persons
and property are prohibited as injuries or trespasses that fail to treat their victims as
ends. The criminal law takes wrongdoing rather than harm as its central focus. 5
Kant frames his discussion of the criminal law through the idea of a social
contract, arguing that all must jointly authorize a civil condition in which
everyone's rights and goods may be coercively protected, and that a
"consequence" of the social contract setting up such a condition is that the
executive branch of the government must have the power to punish crimes. The
parties to the contract must be motivated by the precept, taken from Ulpian, to
protect their "rightful honor" that is, to "never allow oneself to be a mere means
for another.",6 The connection to the criminal law is not drawn explicitly, but
Kant's point is that the criminal law is required so as to prevent wrongdoers from
making the existence of a public rightful order the means through which they
wrong others, that is, to prevent them from turning right into a means for
wrongdoing. In crimes against person and property, the criminal treats his victim
as a mere thing. As such, the victim is entitled to private redress in the form of
damages. But the criminal also turns the structure of a rightful condition against
itself, using it as the means through which another can be wronged with impunity.
Persons concerned with protecting their rightful honor could not authorize a
condition in which that can happen; to allow it would be to authorize wrongdoing
provided that damages were paid. The person who sets out to wrong another
cannot merely be made to disgorge his gains or pay damages. Such payment could
in principle entitle the criminal to wrong his victim, as a matter of right, simply by
paying the requisite fee. The state can only prevent this from happening by
threatening to visit the wrongdoer's wrong back upon him, so that the wrong does
not become a possible means through which he pursues his ends. The threat of
punishment makes the wronging of the victim normatively unavailable, that is, it is
something that the wrongdoer cannot rightfully acquire through his act. That
threat does not guarantee that no crime will go undetected or unpunished, because
nothing could guarantee that.
5 The Kantian approach thus avoids the need to concoct remote harms to explain ordinary
wrongs. See, e.g., John Gardner & Steven Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 193 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th Series 2000). Gardner and Shute seek to reduce the
primary wrong of rape to a remote one by claiming that a rape of a drugged woman that is never
discovered violates a general rule that is justified by the fact that it prevents harm.
6 KANT, supra note 1, at 392.
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Kant's contractarian account of punishment shows that the punishment of
such conduct is something that everyone must authorize, as a condition of entering
a civil condition, since everyone has an interest in not being wronged by another.
For Kant, the parties to a social contract are concerned with preserving their
independence, that is, concerned that they not become a mere means for another, or
become entirely dependent on another's choice. The criminal law is an expression
of this condition of the contract, since crime is a way in which one person treats
another's freedom as a mere means or obstacle in pursuit of his own purposes, thus
rendering the latter subject to his will. Kantian contractors have no parallel interest
in avoiding the pains of punishment. To be punished for a wrong you have
committed is not in any way incompatible with your claim to independence.
II. IN EXTREMIS
The law's response to extreme circumstances is widely held to reveal its
underlying presuppositions. For Hobbes, extreme circumstances force the law to
revert to a state of nature, because they lay bare the system's fundamental premise
of individual self-preservation. Hobbes thus insists that in extremis men have "a
right to everything, even to one another's body.",8 For Hegel, such circumstances
reveal the conceptual priority of persons over property. For H.L.A. Hart, the
criminal law's aim of giving effect to choice must run out when the agent is faced
with an offer he cannot refuse. For the utilitarian, emergencies reveal ordinary
rules to be mere heuristics to be abandoned when they will not produce their usual
results. For George Fletcher, dire circumstances make the criminal law worthless
as a measure of the character of wrongdoers.
Kant's more general theoretical views about law and coercion cannot make
room for any of these standard ways of thinking about emergencies, whether
couched in terms of justification or excuse. He must reject the Hobbesian account,
because he regards all rights as relational, and so cannot accept the idea of "a right
to all things" that is not a right in relation to others. He cannot allow a general
utilitarian defense of lesser evils; to allow it would be to license one person to treat
another as a mere means to his own purposes, or those of a third party. He cannot
accept the Hegelian view that the law presupposes a hierarchy of values, and so
must not punish those who act in keeping with that hierarchy, 9 because he insists
that the law must abstract from what he calls the "matter" of an agent's choices,
and so from "mere need or wish."' The fact that I need something in order to
7 Kant makes this point in his preferred vocabulary of noumena and phenomena, saying that
as a noumenal self, I must will that crimes be punished, though as a phenomenal self I will the
commission of a crime. I do not will the punishment upon myself. KANT, supra note 1, at 476.
8 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 80 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (1651).
9 GEORGE W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 155 (H.B. Nisbet trans.,
1991). For an elaboration and defense of Hegel's argument, see Alan Brudner, A Theory of
Necessity, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (1987).
10 KANT, supra note 1, at 387.
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survive cannot give me a right to that thing, and so cannot justify my taking it. It
is incumbent on the state to provide for those in need, but that duty neither grows
out of, nor generates, an enforceable duty on the part of one private citizen to aid
another, and so cannot justify a corresponding right on the part of the person in
peril to take what he needs.
Nor can Kant accept the standard contemporary analyses of excusing
conditions. He must reject H.L.A. Hart's idea that it is unfair to punish a person
who lacked the capacity or opportunity to bring his conduct into conformity with
the law. For Hart, the criminal law is a system that is supposed to give effect to
people's choices, by providing them with fair warning that they will be punished if
they choose to do certain things. Kant cannot accept the idea that the criminal law
is a series of offers, because these are not offers that anyone could rightfully make.
Criminals are not punished because the law includes the bundle (crime,
punishment) among the available options; they are punished because they do
something that is legally not an option. As a result, he must reject Hart's view that
we decline to punish where the offer was on unattractive terms because the other
available choices were limited. Kant cannot endorse George Fletcher's claim that
excusing conditions block the inference from an agent's conduct to his character,
because he must deny that character is relevant to criminal wrongdoing. And he
cannot accept the idea that people who act in emergencies are the subjects of
judicial compassion, because that would make their excuses contingent in the
wrong way. If we did not feel sorry for the person who responds to extreme
circumstances, that would not make it appropriate to punish him; if we happened to
feel sorry for the person who was overwhelmed by greed or lust, that would not
make it appropriate to reduce his punishment.' Each of the standard accounts
presupposes some idea of legality that is divorced from the idea of reciprocal limits
on freedom.
Kant's analysis, if it can be defended, has profound implications not only for
criminal law theory, but also for legal and political philosophy more generally.
Kant's basic premise is that there is a special morality governing what people may
be forced to do. The failure to distinguish between what someone should do and
what he can rightly be forced to do has been the reef on which much legal and
political philosophy has foundered. 12 The fact that someone should do something
does not license others to force him to do that thing. Nor does the fact that
someone should do something mean that others must aid him or even acquiesce in
his so doing. As a result, enforceable legality will not necessarily track moral
blameworthiness.
1 See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (1992).
12 1 discuss this issue in more detail, and defend Kant's account, in Ripstein, supra note 4.
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III. THE PLANK
In the Appendix to the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant considers
two cases of what he refers to as "ambiguous" or "equivocal" right: cases of
equity, and of necessity. The issue of necessity concerns the question of whether
there is a right to use force against someone who has done no wrong to me, that is,
the case of what philosophers have recently taken to calling "innocent threats."
Kant puts the problem in its starkest form, asking whether I am authorized to take
the life of another person in such circumstances. But his answer is clearly meant to
be more general: there is no right of necessity because my circumstances could
never give me a right that I would not otherwise have. Indeed, because rights
always govern relations between persons, and set reciprocal limits on their
freedom, nothing specific about me could give me a right that I otherwise did not
have. Merely being in a condition of want or need could not give me a right
because my wants and needs do not implicate others in the right way.
The situation of necessity, as posed by the innocent threat, is different from
the case of defense against an aggressor, where, as Kant remarks, the
"recommendation to show moderation belongs not to right but only to ethics."' 3 I
have no obligation to restrain myself in the face of an aggressor, although virtue
may well require me to do so. Force may be used to forestall a wrongdoer. Where
the other person has done no wrong, I could not have an authorization to use force
against him. The contrast between harm and wrong is crucial here: the other sailor
already on the plank does not wrong me by being on the plank. He harms me, at
least in the counterfactual sense that I am much worse off than I would have been
had he not grabbed the plank first. But the mere fact that someone worsens my
comparative situation in virtue of being "where nature or chance has placed him,"'
14
does not entitle me to better that situation by removing him. Indeed, even if he
harms me not merely counterfactually, but through some affirmative deed, I would
only be entitled to use force against him if that deed was wrongful. If he had
pushed me off the plank first, I could rightfully dislodge him, because he would be
a wrongdoer. Kant writes:
[T]here can be no penal law that would assign the death penalty to
someone in a shipwreck who, in order to save his own life, shoves
another, whose life is equally in danger, off a plank on which he had
saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not be
greater than the loss of his own life. A penal law of this sort could not
have the effect intended, since a threat of an ill that is still uncertain
(death by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is
certain (drowning). Hence the deed of saving one's life by violence is
not to be judged inculpable . . . but only unpunishable . . . . and by a
13 KANT, supra note 1, at 391.
14 Id. at 414.
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strange confusion jurists take this subjective impunity to be objective
impunity (conformity with law).15
Care is required in explaining just why law cannot guide in such
circumstances. Of course, it may guide some in conscience: the drowning sailor
may say to himself, "Thou shalt not kill," as he swims away from the plank. This
possibility is not ruled out; indeed, Kant concedes that this may happen even in the
face of aggression, where there is no obligation to refrain from using force.
External lawgiving does not depend upon its ability to guide in conscience, but
rather on its ability to secure the conditions of equal freedom. If that is what it is
supposed to do then, in circumstances in which the wrongdoer could not be guided
by the law's threats, the law has failed to threaten at all, and so cannot punish. '
6
The claim that the wrongdoer could not be so guided is not empirical. As
Dennis Klimchuk has shown, Kant offers it as an analysis of the very idea of a
threat.' 7 A threat provides an incentive to action if the agent represents it as an
evil. Kant's claim is that insofar as fear of death is an incentive for the sailor, the
prospect of certain death must move him more than any prospect of uncertain
death. A threat can only be carried out if it can be made; here the threat can be
uttered but not made. Again, we might imagine that the prospect of a slow and
painful death, or of punishment meted out against the wrongdoer's family, might
be sufficient to deter in even the most extreme circumstances. Kant takes it for
granted that this is not an option, because the rationale for punishment is
systematic: crimes of a particular type merit a particular type of punishment. To
increase the punishment in response to the difficulty of the circumstances in which
the wrongdoer finds himself would be incompatible with the systematic concern
with reciprocal limits on freedom that provides punishment with its rationale in the
first place. That rationale precludes extreme punishments for ordinary murderers,
and so precludes them for murderers who kill in emergencies.
It might be thought that the two fears are not equivalent, because even without
an enhanced penalty, the prospect of being found guilty of murder and executed
might strike some people as worse than death itself. Yet if the fear in question is
the fear of being thought, or found, to be a wrongdoer, Kant's point still goes
through.18 Some particular drowning sailor might well fear a trial and conviction,
but the law does not have trials and verdicts as a way of shaping the behavior of
those who happen to fear them. The punishment that is threatened is supposed to
15 Id. at 392.
16 For a discussion of the history of the example, see Joachim Hruschka, On the History of
Justification and Excuse in Cases of Necessity, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE
RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS (Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994).
17 Dennis Klimchuk, Necessity, Deterrence, and Standing, 8 LEGAL THEORY 339 (2002).
18 It has recently become fashionable to focus on the trial as the central locus of the criminal
law. For an extreme version of this, see John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 157 (2003).
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visit the wrong back upon the wrongdoer, insofar as it is possible to do so, and
conviction for a crime is not part of the wrong that the punishment seeks to
address. So the collateral incentive of the fear of a trial is not part of the purpose
of punishment. It is also perhaps worth noting that if the thing that the imagined
sailor most fears is it becoming known that he did wrong, that might well move
him even if he is not punished. The criminal law cannot presuppose such
motivations of honor, so it cannot make them part of the measure of punishment.
Kant's account of deterrence contrasts with the more familiar utilitarian
understanding of it, according to which its point is exclusively forward-looking:
we punish the wrongdoer when he violates the law so as to warn others of what
will happen to them, and so discourage them from wrongdoing. This form of
deterrence operates empirically: the appropriate measure of punishment depends
upon the way in which those to whom it is addressed are likely to reason about
whether to commit a crime. Their reasoning will presumably be a function of the
magnitude of sanction if they are caught committing a crime, and their beliefs
about the likelihood of apprehension and conviction. Such empirical deterrence
can operate in emergencies: if the sailor who dislodges the other is convicted, and
that conviction is publicized, others in less extreme situations may hesitate to break
the law. As Lord Coleridge says in Regina v. Dudley and Stevens, the law can
"speak most loudly" in such situations. 19 For the Kantian account, deterrence
cannot be exclusively forward-looking, or proportional to the likelihood of
detection.
As Joachim Hruschka has shown, Kant's treatment of necessity reflects his
more general reliance on a sequenced account of imputation of a sort that has
recently become prominent in criminal law theory.20 The first stage is concerned
with the direction of conduct: the criminal law tells people what they are and are
not allowed to do, and in some instances, what they are required to do. The second
is concerned with the legal system's response to conduct: it tells judges what can
and cannot be punished. The former aims to guide prospectively; the latter is
applied retrospectively. Because the account is sequenced, the first stage enjoys a
certain kind of priority, for it is the stage that determines the appropriate
description of a person's action. The second stage is concerned with the legal
system's response to the action so described, but does not lead to a new description
of it.
At both levels of analysis, Kant's analysis of imputation is a consequence of
the idea of equal freedom, rather than an independent piece of analysis. Questions
about whether a deed can be imputed to an agent are not empirical or even
theoretical questions. Instead, imputation takes place in relation to a norm of
conduct, and gets its point from the system of norms. At the first level, the
pertinent question is: Has the accused interfered with the freedom of another? The
answer must be "yes," for he has chosen to take another person's life. Has the
'9 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
20 See generally Joachim Hruschka, Imputation, 1986 BYU L. REv. 669.
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accused made the interference with another's freedom the means through which he
pursues his purposes? Again, the answer must be "yes," for he took that life to
spare his own. At this first stage of imputation, we know all we need to in order to
assess civil damages. One person interfered with the rights of another, and he can
be compelled to make good the loss he thereby created. At this first level of
analysis-the only level that is possible for private right-the sailor remains
subject to compulsion by a court, even though his acts could not be compelled
prospectively, because he can be compelled to make up the loss by having his
assets attached (if he has any). At this level of analysis, coercion can still operate
after the fact to restore to each what is rightfully his, at least by giving the sailor's
survivors damages equivalent to the income they would have received from him
had he lived.
At the second stage of analysis, we ask again if the act can be imputed to the
sailor. This time we ask whether it can be so imputed for purposes of punishment.
The only way we can answer this question is by asking the underlying question
which it presupposes: Did the state threaten to punish this sort of action? This time
the answer must be "no," because the state cannot threaten where the threat cannot
shape conduct. It can at most announce its intention to punish in these
circumstances, but so announcing would not make a difference to conduct, and so
would be irrelevant to the accused's ability to wrong the other as a matter of right.
At this level of analysis, coercion only guides conduct prospectively. Where it
must fail to do so, the only possible coercive response is the mandatory payment of
damages. That is just to say that the sailor who pushes the other off the plank
commits murder successfully.
The Kantian account gives a novel expression to the truth underlying
contemporary theories of excuses. George Fletcher's account, which understands
excuses as modeled on the idea of involuntariness, is right about something: to
make and carry out a threat that must fail is as pointless as punishing an
involuntary act. You can visit pain on a person for a deed that he will commit
regardless of what you threaten to do to him, but you cannot threaten to do so in
order to stop him from doing that deed. Thus the acts in question are punitively
involuntary, because the criminal law cannot speak to them. Fletcher's related
claim that we excuse crimes when anyone would have done the same thing also
contains a grain of truth: the criminal law coerces performance by demanding it,
and so must assume that its demands make a difference to how people will behave.
When life is in peril, the law must assume that people will ignore its threats, and so
must assume that anyone else would have done the same. Such an assumption is
systematic, not empirical. Hart is also right about something: if someone lacks the
capacity or opportunity to conform to the law, his conduct cannot be punished,
because to do so would be incompatible with the law's claim to guide conduct.
We do not need to talk about maximum space for deciding whether to obey the law
or the fairness of the opportunities thus created to see this point: where there is no
capacity or opportunity, there is no system of choices, and so no system of choices
that is either fair or unfair. The law as such cannot shape one's conduct. In each
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case, Kant offers a more direct account of the phenomena that Fletcher and Hart
seek to explain.
These advantages of Kant's view should come as no surprise, for they are a
reflection of his more general insight that not every judgment made by an
institution is an all-things-considered judgment about the overall merit or
responsibility of the person being judged. This point is familiar in other contexts.
If a student fails to hand in a paper on time because of the death of a family
member, she gets an extension, that is, the ordinary penalty for lateness is waived.
The standard accounts of necessity as either a justification or an excuse all have
their analogues here. Some may think this is a case of a justification: it is right to
change your priorities when a family member dies. Others may think that she is
excused because it is unfair to hold her to a deadline she lacks the capacity or
opportunity to meet. Still others may think of it as an expression of compassion:
we feel sorry for the student, and so go easy on her. The analogous Kantian
analysis gives a more perspicuous explanation: The very purpose of, and
justification for, deadlines in coursework cannot be made to apply to this case.
People are ordinarily sufficiently distraught and preoccupied in such circumstances
that their academic work, if done on time, would not be a measure of their ability
or mastery of the material. Other factors may well interfere with the ability to do
work on time-laziness, focus on other coursework, and so on. None of these
things normally excuses lateness because all of them are factors that the system of
assigning grades takes to be normal circumstances that students can be expected to
plan around. The idea of assigning grades presupposes a distinction between the
ordinary stresses and pressures of life and those that overwhelm the capacity to
perform up to one's ability. Thus, no purpose inherent in the imposition of
deadlines could be served by holding an overwhelmed student to one.
21
The academic examples are different from the legal examples, because the
academy differs from the criminal law. In the academic cases, excuses are those
claims that make the ordinary norms and practices of the university ineffective or
pointless. In the legal context, excuses are the things that make the ordinary norms
and practices of the criminal law-the making of threats, that is-ineffective or
pointless.
To suppose extensions reflect some idea of justification is to make the
mistake of supposing that every institution must answer to everything of moral
significance. To suppose that extensions reflect compassion on the part of
instructors or administrators is to make the mistake of supposing that excuses are
at the whim of those with power. Standard treatments of necessity in the law make
one or both of these mistakes.
21 The communicative theories of punishment made prominent by Joel Feinberg, Jean
Hampton, and Antony Duff have their analogues here too. The communicative function is (as
Feinberg himself rightly emphasized) a result of punishment, but not its purpose. We professors do
not impose deadlines and grant extensions to tell people what good character is: we do so to grade
their work fairly.
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IV. EXTENDING THE ACCOUNT: LIFE AND PROPERTY
A hiker, caught in a sudden storm, breaks into a cabin to save his life. The
hiker commits a wrong against the owner of the cabin: he uses another person's
property without his consent, and as a result is liable in damages for the lock he
breaks, the food he eats, and the furniture he bums. On Kant's analysis, the
interference with the property of another is imputable to him at the first of the two
levels. He is a trespasser. The harder question is whether he thereby commits a
crime. The Kantian analysis of this case must be parallel to the analysis of the
sailors struggling over the plank. No deterrent suitable to the crime of breaking
and entering could ever prevent the hiker from saving his life.
The competing analysis is not that he commits a wrong for which he cannot
be punished, but rather that the hiker does the right thing, and so his act is
justified. 22 The lesser-evils analysis may appear to comport more closely with
ordinary intuitions. Nonetheless, I want to suggest that the Kantian account gives
us a better understanding even in this case of the distinctively legal response.
It might be thought that if Kant's account is defensible at all, it is limited to
the factual context in which the threatened punishment is the same as the
threatened peril. Abolish capital punishment and we might be thought to lose the
formal character of the inference. Make the peril facing the actor not death, but
bodily injury, then, unless the punishment for the crime in question involves
maiming, the conceptual connection appears not to hold. Direct the threat towards
the actor's child rather than the actor, and the same problem arises.
I want to suggest, nonetheless, that the conceptual connection to which Kant
draws our attention holds in each of these cases, not as a matter of how ordinary
people will reason, but rather as a matter of how the criminal law must conceive of
their reasoning. The connection is not to be found at the level of the individual
decision maker, but as a reflection of the systematic nature of punishment. The
criminal law presupposes some grading of offenses in terms of their seriousness:
more serious offenses receive more serious punishments. This idea of
proportionality is framed conceptually, in terms of wrong done, rather than
empirically, in terms of cost. If, as Kant contends, punishment visits the wrong, or
some proxy for it, back upon the wrongdoer, more serious crimes must receive
more serious punishments. As a result, the criminal law cannot abandon this idea
of proportionality in the application of its own threats. We have already seen this
point once: it cannot punish murder committed in extreme circumstances more
severely than murder committed in more ordinary ones. More generally, the
criminal law must deem its system of threats to be ordered in a certain way, so that
it must take the conceptual thesis to be true, so that no property offense can be
punished so severely as to make the distant prospect of the punishment outweigh
22 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 761 (1978). Fletcher cites the tort
case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), as an example of this
reasoning.
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the immediate prospect of saving one's own life. This will almost certainly turn
out to be true as a factual matter. But the law must take it to be true based on its
own conception of wrongdoing and punishment. Once this systematic idea is filled
out, we will see that the criminal law must exempt from punishment in each of
these cases, not because the agent is not blameworthy, but because the law's claim
to be systematic must determine the manner in which punishment is meted out.
Kant's example is an extreme one: taking the life of another person to save
my own. Equally familiar is the case of the hiker. The hiker fears for his life, but
the only punishment he might fear is a short prison term for breaking and entering.
Since no deterrent purpose could be served by threatening him with death, no such
purpose could be served by threatening any less severe punishment. If the threat of
the most severe punishment must fail, then the threat of any lesser punishment
must fail. The point, once again, is not empirical. It may well be that there are
some people who would rather die than face the prospect of a criminal trial and
conviction. "Death before dishonor," they might say. Although this may be true
as a matter of fact, the system of penal laws must conceive of persons in terms of
its own structure of incentives, not in terms of their idiosyncratic attitudes towards
particular punishments.
The systematic nature of punishment and the consequent systematic grading
of penalties enables Kant to reveal the element of truth in Hegel's analysis of
necessity in terms of the relative priority of life over property. Hegel moves from
the unexceptionable claim that crimes against persons are more serious than crimes
against property, and the equally unexceptionable claim that no property crime
merits a punishment as severe as the punishment for murder, to the much stronger
claim that when life is at stake, one person is justified in using or destroying the
property of another. Hegel contends that in the conceptual order at the heart of
any legal system, life takes priority over property, so that anybody who commits a
crime against property in order to save a life is justified in doing so.
The Kantian analysis has no space for any such idea, since, for Kant, right
must abstract from "the matter" of choice, and so from both wish and need. For
Kant, there is a clear sense in which life takes priority over property even at the
level of external lawgiving, because life is the presupposition of the ownership of
property. But from the standpoint of external lawgiving, that priority must be
personal to the one whose life and property it is. Anything else would allow one
person to be a mere means for another's purposes, because it would make my title
to use what is mine in pursuit of my own purposes subject to the needs of another
person. Kant insists that right must abstract from the "matter" of choice, including
wish and need, precisely to preserve this independence. As a result, the priority of
personality over property is not the same priority that the Hegelian account
requires, which is priority across persons: for Hegel, my need takes priority over
your right to property.
23 HEGEL, supra note 9.
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The difficulty involved in making the priority of life over property into the
basis for a justification is more obvious in another case of relative priority, that of
life over bodily integrity. Staying alive is more important than loss of limb.
Nobody-not even those who would criminalize self-mutilation-would deny that
the hiker who cuts off his arm to save his life is fully justified in so doing.
Nobody-not even those who deny that consent is properly a defense to a charge
of maiming-would deny that the surgeon who amputates a limb in order to save a
life is justified in so doing. But if the surgeon's patient is a competent adult and
does not wish to lose the limb, the surgeon is not justified in using force despite the
genuine priority of life over limb. And few would claim that the priority of life
over limb justifies forcible seizure of one person's kidney to save another person's
life, just as few would claim that the priority of life over mobility justifies
restraining one person so that another can borrow her kidneys. 24 Retuming to the
example of the priority of life over property, nobody has a duty to destroy his own
property to save his own life. For the Kantian, enforceable rights are always rights
to independence, not to existence. The problem with the idea that the use or
destruction of property is justified when life is at stake is that it cannot explain how
the priority carries over across persons, except by turning into either the utilitarian
account that says that any is person justified in putting a thing to its most efficient
use, or the Hobbesian one that says that when life is at stake, all enforceable rights
evaporate.
2 5
Despite these difficulties, the lesser evils account has other sources of appeal.
It probably also gets some of its appeal from the thought that, if you were breaking
into my cabin to save your life, it would be wrong of me to throw you back out in
the cold. If a police officer were standing by, it would be wrong for him to try to
stop you from saving your life. It is tempting to combine this thought with the
commonplace of criminal law theory according to which one is not justified in
interfering with justified actions. The reasoning behind the commonplace is
beyond question: a justification changes legal relationships between persons, but
an excuse is personal to the person excused, and cannot change the rights of
others.26  Combining the commonplace with the obvious wrongfulness of
24 Nor would it justify forcibly detaining a person to service another with her kidneys. Judith
Jarvis Thomson once remarked, considering the hypothetical example of a person who has been
kidnapped by the society of music lovers so that his kidneys can be used to cleanse the blood of a
famous violinist, "If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do not do
what is impermissible, if you reach around your back and unplug yourself from that violinist." Judith
Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 52 (1971).
25 It also has difficulty explaining why civil damages would be awarded. If a deed is justified
by the priority of life over property, that priority must hold in the civil as well as the criminal context.
It is sometimes said that the person who acts in circumstances of necessity must pay civil damages
because he is unjustly enriched. Any such account of unjust enrichment must deny that the priority
of life over property carries over across persons, on pain of being unable to articulate the nature of the
relevant injustice.
26 FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 762.
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interfering, it is perhaps tempting to draw the conclusion that your breaking into
my cabin is justified. Matters are more complicated, however.2 7  The
commonplace about how one may respond to justified action actually points in
both directions in this sort of case. First of all, there are different ways in which I
might interfere with your breaking in. Even if it were true that you are justified in
using my cabin to save your life, it does not follow that I must leave my cabin
unlocked so that it is easy for you to do so. I might be justified in doing various
things that make it difficult or even impossible for you to do so, simply because
securing my cabin will keep out wild animals or thieves, even if it might frustrate
your ability to break in.
Second, and more importantly, any right to use force against a wrongdoer
must be subject to the condition that the person defending his or her property not
commit a serious wrong (or danger of serious wrong) against the trespasser. The
fact that you wrong me by breaking into my cabin does not entitle me to put you
into mortal danger once you are safe, even if you have no right that I spare you
from a danger you are already in. Although I can lock my cabin, knowing full well
that it might keep you out in an emergency, in so doing I do not put you in any
danger you were not already in. I simply fail to provide you with the means to
save your life. Anything I do to exclude you must not, however, put you into
serious danger. I cannot use a spring gun to keep trespassers out of my cabin, even
if I am certain that any trespasser will be a wrongdoer. (Perhaps it is located
someplace where the weather never gets bad enough to constitute an emergency).
Just as I am not allowed to shoot trespassers, so too you are not allowed to throw
stowaways overboard from your boat. Neither is a police officer allowed to do
either of these things. It does not follow from any of these prohibitions that either
the trespassers or stowaways are justified in doing what they do.
The idea of proportionality that is at work here can be thought of as one way
of thinking about the priority of life over property. Nobody is entitled to take the
life of another to protect his own property. It is, however, a very different
understanding of that priority than the Hegelian understanding according to which
any person is justified in using another's property to preserve his or her life. On
the understanding under consideration here, the priority manifests itself in limits on
the ways in which wrongs can be addressed, rather than in the definition of those
wrongs.
27 The inference also fails as a matter of form: the truth of the consequent "q" of a conditional
statement of the form "ifp then q" is consistent with the falsity of the antecedent "p." To infer that
an act is justified from the fact that the use of lethal force against it is not justified is to commit the
logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. The formal difficulties do not show that the antecedent is
false. That is why I attend to its intuitive ambiguities and weaknesses in the text.
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V. EXTENDING THE ACCOUNT: RESCUING A THIRD PARTY
The examples so far have been easy in that the person who is excused is the
one whose life is in peril. Cases in which the person who violates the law does so
because of a danger to another person require an additional level of analysis.
Before turning to that analysis, I pause to consider the idea of lesser evils as a
defense in these cases.
Cases of self-help are no different from cases in which one person rightfully
helps a third party. If you (or your dog) are about to attack me, I can defend
myself. Anyone else can do the same to protect me against aggression. The
authorization to help a third party in this situation comes from the way in which
the defender is acting on another person's behalf. If one person is entitled to do
something, then, as a general matter, another is entitled to do that very thing on his
or her behalf.
It is a commonplace of criminal law theory that no parallel transfer principle
applies to excuses. If you break the law in a way that is not justified but only
excused-because, for example, you are mistaken-my acts in aiding you are
neither justified nor excused unless I have an independent justification or excuse.
If I share your mistake, I am excused on grounds of mistake, not because you are
mistaken, but because I am. If you would have been excused if you did something,
but I do it, and you do not, then the status of my act as excused depends on
whether excusing conditions apply to me, not on whether they would have applied
to you.
This commonplace appears to make it difficult to extend the view I have been
advancing to cases in which a person who is not in danger breaks the law to save
the life of another who is. Even if the person in peril would not be punishable, the
rescuer, it seems, would be. Nonetheless, I now argue that the Kantian account
provides a more satisfactory explanation of these cases.
Let me introduce another extreme example: a parent commits a crime against
property to save the life of his or her child. In Perka v. The Queen,28 Madame
Justice Bertha Wilson says that where there is a special duty to aid owed, as there
is between parents and children, such an act is justified, even though in the case of
rescuing a stranger (or rescuing oneself) the lawbreaking would merely be
excused. The parent's duty to the child generates a justification. Wilson's claim is
surely too strong. If neither parent nor child would be justified in breaking in on
his own behalf, it is difficult to see how the parent would be entitled to break in on
the child's behalf.29 A duty owed to one person does not provide a justification for
wronging another. I cannot steal a car because I have been subpoenaed to appear
in court, or rob a bank to pay my taxes or debts.30
28 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232.
29 See, e.g., Brudner, supra note 9.
30 This is clear even in the case Justice Wilson considers. Suppose a kidnapper threatens to
kill a child, unless his or her parents commit some illegal act short of murder. Virtually all parents
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Still, the relationship between parent and child does shape the way the law
must view this situation. The child would be excused if she broke into the cabin.
The parent, who has an obligation to the child (legal and moral) and who is,
moreover, as Kant puts it, "in possession" of the child, must act on the child's
behalf.
In the case of the parent saving the life of the child, the existence of the
relevant relationship is straightforward, since parents are, on both Kantian and
ordinary juridical analysis, in possession of their children, having, as Kant puts it
"brought [them] into the world without [their] consent and on [the parents'] own
initiative." 3 1  Some such transfer principle is fundamental to their legal
relationship: the parent has a duty to act on the child's behalf. The parent must not
use the child to pursue his own purposes, and must, as Kant puts it, "manage and
develop" the child, so that the child can grow into a self-directing being. That is
just to say that their interactions must be understood as structured by the parent's
obligation to act on the child's behalf, so that the parent's act must be treated as the
child's. If I enroll my daughter in school, she is enrolled in school. If I hold funds
in trust for my son, he gets any income they earn, because I am his agent. And if I
break into a cabin in a storm to save either of them, I act on their behalf, not on my
own.
32
Acting on the child's behalf does not license the parent to commit a crime.
The tabloid stories of the parents who falsify their children's test scores or kill their
playground rivals are paradigms of unjustified behavior. They are unjustified, and
also inexcusable. Were the child to do any of these things, she would be neither
would yield to the kidnapper's demand; any parent who did would not be punished. Were a parent to
refuse, however, it is difficult to imagine that any legal system would punish the parent for failing to
provide the necessities of life to the child.
31 KANT, supra note 1, at 429-30, explains this in some detail. His argument is a "deduction"
in his sense of the term: an uncovering of the presuppositions of the moral significance of relations
between parents and children.
32 I have not given Kant's conception of agency and his sequenced account of imputation the
full defense they deserve. It is worth noting in passing that they provide a simple and satisfying
account of the notorious Morgan case, DPP v. Morgan [1976] A.C. 182, in which the defendants
raped a woman and claimed to have believed that she had consented because her husband had assured
them that she did, and had told them that she would struggle to increase her satisfaction. The House
of Lords rejected their story as incredible, but held that as a matter of law, a genuine but mistaken
belief about consent is a complete defense to a charge of rape. On a Kantian analysis, the case can be
analyzed as one in which the husband claimed to be consenting on behalf of his wife, and the
defendants claimed to take his claim as authorized by the wife. Their claim to have believed that she
consented must therefore fail as a matter of law. They could never be entitled to believe the husband
in the face of any apparent contrary evidence. A principal cannot authorize an agent to bind him or
her to specific performance of a personal action. Therefore, no third party could ever be entitled to
accept the agent's representations if the principal indicates a contrary intention. A prize-fighter can
authorize his manager to book fights for him, but if he has second thoughts and tries to leave the ring,
nobody is entitled to block his exit, regardless of what his manager says. The Morgan defendants are
claiming an equivalent entitlement, but no belief, even if true, could ever provide the basis for such
an entitlement.
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justified nor excused. The parent is, in a sense, acting as the child's agent, and an
agent can acquire no justification that the principal does not have. I want to
suggest, however, that if the child would have been excused on grounds of
necessity, so is the parent. The example of parents and children is distinctive,
because both the relationship and the sense in which parents must be taken to act
on behalf of their children is so clear.
Can a similar relationship be found in other cases? As a matter of private law,
when one person acts to preserve the life of another, he or she is also taken to be
acting on the person's behalf. As a matter of tort law, rescuers of life are always
treated as foreseeable, however unlikely they may be, although rescuers of
property are treated as intervening actors, however common they may be. In the
law of restitution, improvers of property are standardly treated as volunteers, with
no claim to restitution for their efforts, but those who act to save the lives of others
are treated as acting on their behalf, and so entitled to restitution for their
unrequested efforts. As a result, we can perhaps find the requisite agency
relationship, and do so without presupposing any special emotional ties that bind
the parties. If so, the rescuer who breaks the law can be thought of as acting on
behalf of the person in peril.
The Kantian approach analyzes the first level of imputation in terms of the
private relations between the parties: the rescuer acts on behalf of the person in
peril. That does not, on its own, settle the question of the second level of
imputation, because it does not determine whether a criminal response to the
rescuer is either possible or appropriate.
We have seen that it is a commonplace that one may not act on behalf of, or in
support of, an act that is merely excused. Just as the commonplace according to
which others may not intervene to prevent a justified act does not license us to
conclude that an act is justified from the wrongfulness of certain interventions, so
too the commonplace about the significance of the acting in support of an excused
action needs to be understood in a more nuanced way.
The rescuer cannot simply claim the benefit of the excuse that the person in
peril would have had. Instead, the difficulty with punishing rescuers for crimes
they commit arises because the criminal law cannot legitimately deprive the person
in peril of the rescuer, and punishing the rescuer would do exactly that. Like the
sailor who deprives another of a plank, the rescuer is culpable but not punishable,
although the reason punishment must fail is different.
Once again, the key idea depends upon the sequenced account of imputation
that Kant provides. Consider again the example of the cabin in the storm. The
cabin owner would wrong the person in peril by forcing him back out into the
storm, once he had rescued himself. But, as a matter of the rights as between the
parties, the cabin owner would not wrong the person in peril by failing to help him
get into the cabin out of the storm. In the same way, the police officer would do
wrong towards the stranded traveler by blocking his way, but does not, at the level
of private right, do wrong by failing to aid him. The thing that would be wrong-
the thing that would be analogous to using a spring gun to prevent trespassers from
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entering-is not failing to provide the traveler with shelter, but depriving the
traveler of something that is his, or putting him into (or back into) the path of
danger. Failing to open the door in the storm merely leaves the traveler in the path
of the storm, a danger that he was already in. Putting him out from the cabin, by
contrast, puts him into a danger that he was not in until somebody wrongfully put
him there.
Now consider the case in which the cabin owner or police officer restrains the
rescuer. Doing so may be a wrong against the rescuer, but put that possibility to
one side, assuming that the rescuer can be restrained in a way that does not
endanger him at all. Would doing so be a wrong against the person in peril? It
would deprive the person in peril of the means to his safety, that is, his rescuer.
Although the peril he faced would not be one of battery, but of storm, once the
rescuer has arrived on the scene, the peril from the storm can be regarded as
completed. In the same way, if someone is dying of thirst in the desert, once he
has a bucket of water within his reach, to deprive him of the bucket is to kill him,
even though he would die of the same cause without the bucket. That risk had run
its course, and he was secure from it. Then he was put back into the danger from
which he had escaped. Here, to deprive the person in peril of his rescuer is to
return him to a peril that he had escaped.
Now consider a more realistic version of the same example. Instead of the
police officer physically apprehending me, or threatening to shoot me if I help the
stranded traveler into a stranger's cabin, suppose instead that the long arm of the
law acts at a distance. I am not threatened immediately by the police officer
standing beside me, but mediately, by the legal system telling me that I will face
time in prison if I help the stranger into the cabin. Just as the police officer cannot
make the threat in circumstances in which making it endangers the life of an
innocent bystander, so too the legal system cannot make a threat in such
circumstances. Because it cannot threaten me-doing so lies outside its rightful
powers-it cannot carry out the threat that it would have made.
There are several things that are worth noticing about this account. The first
is that it depends upon the Kantian analysis of punishment in terms of threats
designed to shape conduct that we saw in the opening section of this paper. It also
depends on the specific analysis of what it is to make a threat to a particular person
that we saw in those opening sections. If a threat to punish cannot be made, then it
cannot be carried out.
The case of rescuing the third party is thus parallel to, but distinct from the
plank case. It is parallel in that the problem with punishment is a result of a defect
in the threat of punishment. In the plank case, it is impossible to make any threat
consistent with the systematic nature of right, since the law must suppose that any
such threat must fail. In the rescue case, it is also impossible to make a threat
consistent with the systematic nature of right, but for a different reason. Any such
threat must pose a great danger to someone other than the person violating the law,
and so be inconsistent with the systematic requirements of right. In each case, the
argument turns on the way in which a just criminal law must be systematic. Actual
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criminal law may depart from these requirements to varying degrees, but its
rationale cannot ever abandon the idea of systematicity entirely.
VI. AFTERWORD: CAN POSITIVE LAW PROVIDE A JUSTIFICATION OF NECESSITY?
My argument in this paper has proceeded at the level at which Kant's
proceeds, that is, at the level of the presuppositions of a legitimate legal system. I
want to close by conceding that that analysis does not preclude a statutory defense
of justification of damaging property while life is in peril. Unlike justifications
such as self-defense, which are required by the systematic structure of the criminal
law, any such defense would have to be statutory. Moreover, it would have to
accompany a criminal law duty to make easy rescues.
There are two consistent possibilities: either the criminal law does not enforce
a duty to make easy rescues, and necessity is never a justification; or, alternatively,
there is a criminal law duty to rescue in some circumstances, and necessity serves
as a justification. The Canadian criminal law coherently, if coldly, takes the first
option; the German criminal law embraces the second-a duty to aid and a right to
use another person's property to save one's own life, provided that damages are
paid.33
There is much to be said in favor of a criminal law duty to make easy rescues,
provided that we steer clear of the idea that such a duty can be grounded in the
utilitarian or Hegelian ways considered above. A better analysis sees the duty to
make easy rescues as of a piece with the duty to pay one's taxes, that is, as part of
a more general system of social cooperation and coordination. 34 On the Kantian
view of freedom, those with property have a duty to pay taxes, so as to enable the
state to satisfy its duty to provide the necessities of life to the poor. On this
account, support for the poor is not a private duty running from one citizen to the
other, but a sort of system of coordination so that private citizens meet their
charitable duties effectively. On the Kantian analysis, the entire point of the public
duty is to see to it that no poor person is subject simply to the charitable
inclinations of those who are more fortunate, for to be so subject is to be a kind of
slave, who manages to continue to exist solely through the grace of those who have
more. 35 A criminal law duty to rescue can be thought of as providing a different
way of thinking about the importance of independence: by threatening those who
refuse to make easy rescues, the criminal law removes the element of discretion
over the life of another that makes poverty so objectionable from the standpoint of
33 Even common law legal systems have small-scale versions of such affirmative duties: the
duty to call the fire department in an emergency; the duty to move out of the way of emergency
vehicles, and so on.
34 I have argued elsewhere that any criminal law duty to rescue must be analyzed in terms of
the general public-law obligation to support schemes of social cooperation. See generally Arthur
Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 LAW & PHIL. 751 (2000).
35 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 795 (2003).
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freedom. Particular other people benefit from its fulfillment, but it is not a private
duty to benefit them in particular. This way of framing a duty to rescue does not
depend on any ideas about the priority of person over property: a duty to aid others
who are in immediate peril is a duty both to make my property available to them
and, just as much, to make my own efforts available to them.
If such a duty is created, it can take on a variety of different contents,
including the duty to make one's property available, on a temporary basis, to those
who need it. If there is such a legal duty, then, in an emergency in which the
person subject to the duty is not present to discharge it, a third party may take it
upon himself to act as that person's agent in discharging it. If you have a legal
obligation to make your cabin available in emergencies, then, in an emergency, I
can act on your behalf, with complete justification, in letting somebody (including
myself) into your cabin. If the criminal law can attach sanctions to this sort of
failure to aid, then the justification of using the property of another to save my own
life or the life of a third party is straightforward: I am simply acting on behalf of
the person who has the obligation to make that property available. But because it
is a public law duty, the person who damages property in saving a life must pay to
repair the property, because the logic of the argument does not require that the
rescuer make a gift to the person in peril.36
36 In order for me to be entitled to do so, however, you, as property owner, must be subject to
the duty. The fact that I am subject to a duty to aid others does not in and of itself entitle me to use
your property to do so, any more than I am entitled to use your property to carry out any of my other
duties.
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